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Abstract
We examine theoretically and experimentally how combining between-team and
within-team incentives affects behavior in team tournaments. Theory predicts that
free-riding will occur when there are only between-team incentives, and offering
within-team incentives may solve this problem. However, if individuals collude,
then within-team incentives may not be as effective at reducing free-riding.
Consistent with the theoretical predictions, the results of our experiment indicate
that although between-team incentives are effective at increasing individual effort,
there is substantial free-riding and declining effort over time. Importantly, a
combination of between-team and within-team incentives is effective not only at
generating effort but also at sustaining effort over time, mitigating free-riding
problem, increasing cooperation and decreasing collusion within teams.
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1. Introduction
The use of teams in organizations has become increasingly popular in the U.S. workplace
and elsewhere (Che and Yoo, 2001; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007). Teams can increase the
efficient application of specialized knowledge and skills to achieve greater collective performance
(Cohen, 1993; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007). Accordingly, how to design incentives in team
settings is an interesting and important topic. Organizations consisting of teams can incentivize
employees’ effort based on (1) individual performance, (2) team performance, or (3) a combination
of both. While the effects of individual and team incentives, in isolation, have been studied in the
literature (e.g., Prendergast, 1999; Konrad, 2009; Connelly et al., 2014), less is known about the
combined effects.
Mixed incentives are widely used in practice (Libby and Thorne, 2009). For example,
Hwang et al. (2009) find that out of 1,780 U.S. manufacturing plants, 525 plants use a combination
of group and individual-based performance measures. A survey conducted by the Center for
Effective Organizations at the University of Southern California (Lawler and Mohrman, 2003)
shows an increasing use of mixed incentives in Fortune 1,000 corporations. Sisk (2005) confirms
that more firms now use a combination of incentives for compensating employees. For instance,
Pfizer Pharmaceutical Group Canada ties all bonuses to the overall performance of Pfizer Canada,
the performance of each person’s team, and each individual’s performance. Further, group
members of audit teams in Ameritech’s Internal Audit Services are compensated not only for their
individual performance rankings within their team but also for their team performance ranking
among other teams; and in the Wilson North Carolina pharmaceutical plant of Merck, employees
can receive rewards based on individual performance, their team’s performance, as well as the
plant’s overall performance (Parker et al., 2000).
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One way to design incentives to motivate agents in both individual and team settings is to
introduce a tournament. The use of tournaments to evaluate and reward performance has increased
in the corporate world (Boyle, 2001; McGregor, 2006; Pfeffer and Sutton, 2006) and in the
workplace (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007; Sheremeta, 2016). In this study, we are particularly
interested in a combination of between-team and within-team tournaments. 1 While it is well
recognized in the literature that individual tournaments can be effective in eliciting high effort
from contestants (Dechenaux et al., 2015), such tournaments are susceptible to collusion,
especially when individuals are allowed to communicate (Harbring, 2006; Sutter and Strassmair,
2009; Cason et al., 2012, 2017). Similarly, within the literature team tournaments have been shown
to effectively generate high effort (Abbink et al., 2010; Sheremeta, 2018), but such tournaments
are susceptible to free-riding (Erev et al., 1993; Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport, 2006). Therefore,
the resulting effort from individuals under combined within-team and between-team tournaments
is not clear as the problems of collusion and free-riding still exist. To study the effectiveness of
the combination of between-team and within-team tournaments in light of these concerns, we
provide a theoretical model and test its predictions in a controlled laboratory experiment.
Our model is built on the seminal nested contest model of Nitzan (1991). Whereas the
original model only contains an individual reward (within-team incentive), to examine our research
question we introduce a team reward (between-team incentive). The inclusion of the team reward
also makes the model more generalizable in practice, because businesses increasingly require
cooperation among employees from across the organization and the use of group rewards is
believed to foster this cooperation (Cohen, 1993; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007). The Nash

1

Of course, the tournament manager has other ways of designing a tournament by changing the structure of the
tournament (Cason et al., 2019), the number of prizes (Orrison et al., 2004; Lim et al., 2009; Müller and Schotter,
2010), the number of players (Orrison et al., 2004), and heterogeneity within the tournament (Weigelt et al., 1989;
Cason et al., 2010).
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equilibrium predicts that free-riding behavior will occur when there are only between-team
incentives, and offering within-team incentives should solve this problem. However, if upon
introduction of the within-team incentives individuals still choose to collude within a team, then
the combined incentives may not be as effective at increasing effort and reducing free-riding.
We tested the predictions of our model using a controlled laboratory experiment in which
a team of three participants competes against another team of three participants by exerting effort.
We used a 2×2 design, by manipulating between-team and within-team incentives. Prior to
competition, participants had an opportunity to communicate with their team members increasing
the likelihood of collusion as well as cooperation. The results of our experiment indicate that
although between-team incentives are effective at increasing individual effort, as predicted by the
theory, there is substantial free-riding and declining effort over time. Within-team incentives are
effective at increasing individual effort, albeit not as effective as between-team incentives in our
experiment due to collusive behavior. Most importantly, a combination of between-team and
within-team incentives is effective not only at generating effort but also at sustaining effort over
time, mitigating free-riding problem, increasing cooperation and decreasing collusion within
teams.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model.
Section 3 describes the experimental design, procedures and testable hypotheses. Section 4
provides analysis and Section 5 concludes by discussing implications and suggesting directions
for future research.
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2. Theoretical Model
Our model is an extension to the seminal nested contest model of Nitzan (1991). Assume
there are two teams competing to win a contest. For simplicity, assume that team 𝐴𝐴 and team 𝐵𝐵

each consist of 𝑁𝑁 risk-neutral players. All players in both teams simultaneously and independently
expend irreversible costly efforts 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , where 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁𝑁 and 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑁𝑁. The team

performance 𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴 (similarly 𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵 ) is the sum of all individual efforts within team 𝐴𝐴 (Katz et al., 1990):
𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴 = ∑𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 .

(1)

After all players of team 𝐴𝐴 and team 𝐵𝐵 choose their efforts, 𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴 and 𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵 are compared. The

probability of team 𝐴𝐴 (similarly team 𝐵𝐵) winning is defined by a contest success function (CSF):
𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 = �

𝛼𝛼 𝑋𝑋

𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴

𝐴𝐴 +𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵

1

+ (1 − 𝛼𝛼) 2 if 𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴 + 𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵 > 0
1
2

if 𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴 = 𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵 = 0

.

(2)

This CSF is different from a standard CSF defined by Skaperdas (1996) and Münster
(2009). One interpretation of the CSF (2) is that winning depends on the “merit” of one team
relative to the other team (between-team incentive) with a probability 𝛼𝛼, and on pure luck with the

remaining probability (1 − 𝛼𝛼) (Konrad, 2009).

All members of the winning team receive a team reward 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 and an individual reward 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 .

When the team reward is present, receiving an individual reward 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 is contingent on receiving 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 .
1

The team reward is equally shared by all team members, so that player 𝑖𝑖 in team 𝐴𝐴 receives 𝑁𝑁 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 .

The individual reward is allocated according to the sharing rule proposed by Nitzan (1991), so that
player 𝑖𝑖 in team 𝐴𝐴 receives 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 , where
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

𝑥𝑥

1

𝛽𝛽 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽) 𝑁𝑁 if 𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴 > 0
= � 𝐴𝐴 1
.
if
𝑋𝑋
=
0
𝐴𝐴
𝑁𝑁

(3)
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Similar to the interpretation of the CSF (2), the sharing rule (3) shows that, with a
probability 𝛽𝛽 the individual reward 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 is allocated according to the “merit” of each individual

within the team (within-team incentive), and with the remaining probability (1 − 𝛽𝛽) the individual

reward is allocated randomly.

as:

Given (2) and (3), the expected payoff of a risk-neutral player 𝑖𝑖 in team 𝐴𝐴 can be written
1

𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 �𝑁𝑁 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 � − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,

(4)

where 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 is the between-team CSF defined by equation (2) and 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an individual’s share of the
individual reward 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 defined by equation (3).

Differentiating (4) with respect to 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (see the derivations in Appendix A), and solving for

the symmetric Nash equilibrium, we receive:
∗
∗
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
=

𝛼𝛼(𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 +𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 )+𝛽𝛽(2𝑁𝑁−2)𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼
4𝑁𝑁 2

.

(5)

A simple comparative static analysis shows that the equilibrium effort (5) is increasing in
𝛼𝛼 (between-team incentive) and in 𝛽𝛽 (within-team incentive).

If, as it is in this study, communication is allowed within each team, prior literature suggests

that all individuals within each team may act cooperatively as one player (e.g., Sutter and
Strassmair, 2009; Cason et al., 2012; Leibbrandt and Sääksvuori, 2012). In such a case, instead of
an individual payoff (4), a risk-neutral player 𝑖𝑖 in team 𝐴𝐴 should maximize the joint team payoff:
1

𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1 �𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 �𝑁𝑁 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 � − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � = 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 (𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 ) − 𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴 .

(6)

Differentiating (6) with respect to 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (see the derivations in Appendix A), and solving for

the symmetric Nash equilibrium, we receive:
∗
∗
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
=

𝛼𝛼(𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 +𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 )
4𝑁𝑁

.

(7)
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Intuitively, since each team member is maximizing the joint team payoff, the equilibrium
effort (7) is only increasing in 𝛼𝛼 (between-team incentive) and it does not depend on 𝛽𝛽 (withinteam incentive).

3. Experimental Design, Procedures and Predictions
3.1. Experimental Design
In order to examine how between-team and within-team incentives affect individual
behavior, we collected data from a computerized experiment conducted with the zTree software
(Fischbacher, 2007). We used a 2×2 design, as shown in Table 1, by manipulating between-team
and within-team incentives. In all four conditions, a team of three participants (i.e., 𝑁𝑁 = 3)

competed against another team of three participants by contributing points to a team account.

These points translated directly into the probabilities of receiving a team reward of 180 (i.e., 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 =

180) and an individual reward of 180 (i.e., 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 = 180). 2

In the baseline NONE condition, all participants automatically split the team reward and

the individual reward. Therefore, there were no between-team or within-team incentives (i.e., 𝛼𝛼 =

0 and 𝛽𝛽 = 0). In WITHIN condition, all participants automatically split the team reward but the
individual reward was allocated according to a lottery rule. For example, if a team member

contributed 30 percent of his/her team’s total output, his/her probability of winning the individual
reward was 30 percent. Therefore, in this condition, there are only within-team incentives (i.e.,
𝛼𝛼 = 0 and 𝛽𝛽 = 1). In BETWEEN condition, the team and individual rewards were allocated

according to a lottery rule between teams but all participants of the winning team automatically
split the team and individual rewards. For example, if a team contributed 70 percent of the two
2

The use of probability function in assigning rewards was designed to be consistent with the typical random noise
added to an output function in labor economics literature (Lazear and Rosen, 1981).
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team’s total output, that team’s probability of winning the team and individual rewards was 70
percent. Therefore, in this condition, there are only between-team incentives (i.e., 𝛼𝛼 = 1 and 𝛽𝛽 =

0). Finally, in BOTH condition, the team rewards and individual rewards were allocated according

to a lottery rule and only the winning team received both rewards. All participants of the winning
team equally shared the team reward. However, the individual reward was allocated based on a
lottery rule within the winning team. That is, only the winning individual in the winning team
received the individual reward. Therefore, in this condition, there are both between-team and
within-team incentives (𝛼𝛼 = 1 and 𝛽𝛽 = 1).
3.2. Experimental Procedures
A total of 144 students at a large university participated in 12 experimental sessions. Each
session lasted about 70 minutes and had 12 participants. Each experimental session consisted of
two parts, corresponding to two incentive conditions from Table 1. 3 The order of the general
experimental procedures is shown in Figure 1. As participants arrived, each was assigned a
computer with privacy dividers. Then participants read the instructions (see Appendix B), after
which they answered several quiz questions to verify their understanding of the instructions. This
quiz ensured that participants understood all relevant aspects of the task and their particular
experimental incentive condition.
In Part 1 of the experiment, corresponding to one of the four experimental incentive
conditions, participants were randomly assigned to a team (three members in each team) and two

3

This design was chosen to minimize the number of participants necessary for the experiment, and to allow us to have
direct within-subject comparisons while controlling for any between-subject differences. The design was completely
counterbalanced. Each session contained 2 out of 4 conditions, yielding a total of 12 ordered combinations: NONEWITHIN, WITHIN-NONE, NONE-BOTH, BOTH-NONE, NONE-BETWEEN, BETWEEN-NONE, WITHINBETWEEN, BETWEEN-WITHIN, WITHIN-BOTH, BOTH-WITHIN, BETWEEN-BOTH, BOTH-BETWEEN.

8

teams were randomly paired. Participants remained in the same team and competed against the
same paired team for 10 periods. 4 In each period, every participant received 60 experimental points
as an endowment and had an opportunity to communicate with their team members for 90 seconds
(40 seconds in periods 3-10) prior to making their decisions. 5 After communication, each
participant privately decided how many points (representing effort) to contribute to a team
account. 6 After all participants made their decisions, they were notified whether they won the team
reward, and if so, then whether they also won the individual reward. Each participant was privately
notified of his or her current period payoff.
In Part 2, all participants were assigned to a new incentive condition. Each participant was
also randomly assigned to a new team where their new teammates were not any of their teammates
in Part 1. The new team was randomly paired with another new team and participants remained in
the same team and competed against the same paired team for 10 periods under the new incentive
condition. To control for an order effect, in each session participants were randomly assigned to
one of 12 combinations of two conditions. 7

4
We purposely did not announce the number of periods in the instructions because we wanted to avoid any end-ofsession effects on participants’ behavior. This technique is commonly used in market experiments (e.g., Rassenti et
al., 2000; Davis et al., 2003; Huck et al., 2004). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to implement this
technique in the context of contests. It is important to emphasize, however, that not announcing the exact number of
periods in a session does not seem to qualitatively change behavior (Normann and Wallace, 2012). In fact, when
comparing our data from BETWEEN condition to a comparable REST condition in Leibbrandt and Sääksvuori (2012),
we find that individual behavior in terms of the average effort is fairly similar (the rate of overbidding is 4.2 versus
5.6).
5
The Nash equilibrium does not depend on the endowment, as long as the endowment is sufficiently large, which is
the case in our experiment.
6
According to standard agency theory (Baiman, 1982; Namazi, 1985), effort is any action that satisfies three
conditions: (1) the agent controls the action, (2) an increase in the action results in a rightward shift of the distribution
of (i.e. greater) output, and (3) the agent receives disutility from exerting effort. Physical exertion is not a requirement
for an action to be regarded as effort.
7
Picking any 2 out of 4 experimental incentive conditions yields a total of 12 ordered combinations (e.g., NONEWITHIN and WITHIN-NONE). Each combination has 2 experimental conditions or parts. With 144 participants in
total, this design results in 12 statistically independent observations (2 teams of 3 individuals each as one observation)
in each condition. We tested our data to see whether there are any order effects. There are no significant differences
between effort levels in BOTH condition, whether it is preceded by NONE, WITHIN, or BETWEEN condition. The
same results hold for BETWEEN, WITHIN, and NONE conditions, except that effort in NONE condition is
significantly higher when it is preceded by BOTH condition, compared to when it is preceded by WITHIN or

9

At the end of the experiment, participants completed a demographic questionnaire. Two
periods (one from each part) were randomly selected for payments. Earnings were converted into
US dollars at the rate of 20 points to $1, and participants received their payments in private and in
cash, ranging from $5 to $23.75, with an average $13.98.

3.3. Predictions
The four experimental conditions test how between-team and within-team incentives affect
individual behavior. If we assume that individuals are perfectly rational and maximize their own
payoffs, then individuals should exert effort defined by equation (5). In such a case, effort in
NONE condition (𝛼𝛼 = 0 and 𝛽𝛽 = 0) should be 0, in WITHIN (𝛼𝛼 = 0 and 𝛽𝛽 = 1) should be
(𝑁𝑁−1)𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼
2𝑁𝑁 2

= 20, in BETWEEN (𝛼𝛼 = 1 and 𝛽𝛽 = 0) should be

𝛽𝛽 = 1) should be

𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 +(2𝑁𝑁−1)𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼
4𝑁𝑁 2

𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 +𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼

= 30.

4𝑁𝑁 2

= 10, and in BOTH (𝛼𝛼 = 1 and

Alternatively, if communication enhances group identity and causes individuals within

each team to act cooperatively as one player, then individuals should exert effort defined by
equation (7). In such a case, effort in NONE condition should be 0, in WITHIN should be 0, in
BETWEEN should be

𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 +𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼
4𝑁𝑁

= 30, and in BOTH should be

𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 +𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼
4𝑁𝑁

= 30.

Finally, it could be the case that individuals have mixed motives, trying to maximize their
individual payoff as well as their joint team payoff. In such a case, effort should be a convex
combination of equations (5) and (7). Assuming a simple weighted average, see Table 2, effort in

BETWEEN condition. Also. there are no order effects for BOTH, BETWEEN, WITHIN, and NONE conditions.
Finally, when needed, we check the robustness of our analysis, by examining the data only from the first part of the
experiment (see Tables 4C and 6C in Appendix C).
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NONE condition should be 0, in WITHIN should be 10, in BETWEEN should be 20, and in BOTH
should be 30.
Based on these predictions, we can state testable hypotheses. First, it is clear that both
between-team and within-team incentives should increase individual effort.
Hypothesis 1: Between-team and within-team incentives increase individual effort relative
to no incentives.
Second, combining between-team and within-team incentives should have the greatest
effect at increasing individual effort.
Hypothesis 2: Combining between-team and within-team incentives has the greatest effect
at increasing individual effort.

4. Results
4.1. Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 provides an overview of the average effort and payoff within each experimental
condition. Also, a graphical summary of results is presented in Figure 2. We use the average effort
over all 10 periods by 6 participants (2 teams) as one independent observation. The Wilcoxon
signed-rank test shows that the average effort in all conditions is higher than the Nash equilibrium
predictions: the average effort is 47.15 in BOTH condition, 42.61 in BETWEEN, 25.07 in
WITHIN, and 9.47 in NONE. 8 This is not surprising, given that the main observation, emerging
from most experimental studies on group contests is that “the actual effort of subjects is

8

We compare the average effort to the predictions stated in Table 2, and find that in only 1 out of 9 cases the average
effort is not significantly different from the predicted value. Specifically, the average effort in NONE is significantly
different from 0 (Wilcoxon signed-rank; p-value < 0.01). The average effort in WITHIN is significantly different from
0 (p-value < 0.01), 10 (p-value < 0.01), but not 20 (p-value = 0.11). The average effort in BETWEEN is significantly
different from 10 (p-value < 0.01), 20 (p-value < 0.01), and 30 (p-value = 0.11). Finally, the average effort in BOTH
is significantly different from 30 (p-value < 0.01).
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signiﬁcantly higher than the Nash equilibrium prediction” (Sheremeta, 2018, p. 2). 9 As a result,
the average earnings is the highest in NONE, followed by WITHIN, then BETWEEN, and finally
BOTH condition. This is due to the game structure. The average earnings in a group contest is
always the highest when the average effort is the lowest. 10

4.2. Differences between Conditions
The main purpose of our experiment was to examine how between-team and within-team
incentives affect individual behavior. Therefore, we first examine whether between-team
incentives (BOTH and BETWEEN conditions) motivate individuals to exert greater effort than
when no between-team incentives are present (WITHIN and NONE conditions). On average,
individual effort under between-team incentives is 27.61 greater than without between-team
incentives (Wilcoxon rank-sum; p-value < 0.01), as shown in Table 4. We also examine whether
within-team incentives (BOTH and WITHIN conditions) have a positive impact on individual
effort. Table 4 shows that, on average, individuals exert 10.07 greater effort under within-team
incentives compared to no within-team incentives (Wilcoxon rank-sum; p-value = 0.07). 11
Result 1: Consistent with Hypothesis 1, both between-team and within-team incentives
increase individual effort.
Next, we examine whether individuals exert the greatest effort when between-team and
within-team incentives are combined (as in BOTH condition). Table 4 shows that the average

9

The most common explanations for significant over-expenditure in group contests are overly competitive behavior
of individuals in contests (Sheremeta, 2013, 2017), overly cooperative behavior in social dilemmas and collective
action games (Ledyard et al, 1995; Chaudhuri, 2011), parochial altruism (Bernhard et al., 2006; Choi and Bowles,
2007), and group identity (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Chowdhury et al., 2016).
10
Effort plays only a redistributive role (i.e., which group and which group member receives the reward), but it is
always costly.
11
We obtain similar results, when examining the data only from the first part of the experiment (see Table 4C in
Appendix C).
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effort in BOTH condition is 37.68 greater than in NONE condition (Wilcoxon rank-sum; p-value
< 0.01), 22.07 greater than in WITHIN condition (Wilcoxon rank-sum; p-value < 0.01), and 4.53
greater than in BETWEEN condition (Wilcoxon rank-sum; p-value = 0.46).
Since each individual participated in two conditions, we can also analyze the data using a
within-subject comparison. This is a more powerful non-parametric test as it gives us direct results
as to how a participant behaves in two different incentive conditions. As shown in Table 5,
individuals in BOTH condition exert the greatest effort, compared to other conditions (Wilcoxon
signed-rank; all p-values < 0.03). This brings us to our next result:
Result 2: Consistent with Hypothesis 2, combining between-team and within-team
incentives has the greatest effect at increasing individual effort.

4.3. Effort over Time
Figure 3 shows the average effort across 10 periods for each condition. There are two
immediate observations. First, there are clear differences between conditions. Second, effort
decreases over time, most notably in NONE and BETWEEN conditions. This is likely due to the
free-riding behavior in these conditions, which tends to increase with the repetition of the
experiment (Chaudhuri, 2011; Sheremeta, 2018). In order to examine how repetition influences
behavior, we conduct a time series cross-sectional regression analysis. In Table 6, we report the
estimated results of linear cross-sectional time-series models with random effects on the
participant level. 12 We use the individual effort in a given period as the dependent variable, and
the period number and constant as independent variables. Estimation results show that effort in
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Taking the average effort in a group of six participants (i.e., both teams) as the unit of observation yields similar
qualitative results.
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NONE and BETWEEN conditions decreases with repetition of the experiment, which is
demonstrated by a significantly negative period coefficient (p-value < 0.01). 13
Result 3: Effort decreases over time when there are no incentives or only between-team
incentives, while it remains stable when there are within-team incentives or combination of
between-team and within-team incentives.
In addition, the regression analysis confirms our previous results. Specifically, the last
column of Table 6 shows that, compared to no incentives (the omitted NONE condition), withinteam incentives (WITHIN condition) increase effort by 15.60 (Wald Chi-Square test; p-value <
0.01), between-team incentives (BETWEEN condition) increase effort by 33.14 (Wald Chi-Square
test; p-value < 0.01), and combined between-team and within-team incentives (BOTH condition)
increase effort by 37.68 (Wald Chi-Square test; p-value < 0.01). Moreover, effort in BOTH
condition is significantly higher than in WITHIN condition (Wald Chi-Square test; p-value < 0.01)
and BETWEEN condition (Wald Chi-Square test; p-value = 0.05), suggesting that combining
between-team and within-team incentives has the greatest effect at increasing individual effort. 14

4.4. Free-riding
In this section, we examine how between-team and within-team incentives affect freeriding. Similar to Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport (2006) and Sheremeta (2011), we define freeriding in a team contest when an individual exerts an effort of 0. Figure 4 shows the frequency of
zero effort in each condition by period. It is important to emphasize that an effort of 0 can be
interpreted as a free-riding only in BETWEEN and BOTH conditions. There are a total of 103

13

It is important to emphasize, however, that after five periods of play, effort stabilizes in all conditions. We have reestimated Table 6 using only the last five periods of data, and found no significant time trend.
14
We obtain similar results, when examining the data only from the first part of the experiment (see Table 6C in
Appendix C).
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instances where individuals free-ride in BETWEEN condition, and only 31 in BOTH condition.
Directly comparing BOTH condition with BETWEEN condition, we find about 69.9 percent less
free-riding in BOTH condition. This difference is significant (Wilcoxon rank-sum; p-value = 0.03),
confirming that a combination of between-team and within-team incentives is effective at
mitigating free-riding problem.
Result 4: There is substantial free-riding when there are only between-team incentives, but
free-riding behavior is reduced when between-team incentives are combined with within-team
incentives.
Although the frequency of free-riding does not necessarily reflect the average effort, it is
interesting to note that the pattern of free-riding in Figure 4 mirrors the pattern of the average effort
in Figure 3. Similar to Table 6, we have estimated linear cross-sectional time-series models with
random effects on the participant level and found that free-riding increases significantly with
repetition of the experiment only in NONE and BETWEEN conditions (p-value < 0.01). Also,
similar to the average effort, free-riding behavior in these conditions stabilizes after five periods
of play.

4.5. Cooperation and Collusion
In our experiment, participants could communicate with each other by sending messages
via chat windows. To analyze these messages, we first read the messages and established a set of
four categories for cooperation and four for collusion. 15 The details of these categories are shown
in Table 7. There are a total of 7,671 communication messages recorded, with an average of 80
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Collusion is a form of cooperation. However, in this study, “cooperation” refers to working hard and/or effort
increasing cooperation. “Collusion” in this study only refers to minimizing effort because collusion within a team
would lead to zero effort due to the fixed reward and costly effort.
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chat messages within a single team in each experimental session. On average, in each experimental
session there are 289 messages in NONE condition, 288 messages in WITHIN, 350 messages in
BETWEEN, and 353 messages in BOTH. Next, two graduate students, trained separately,
independently read and coded the communication messages for each team in each period,
assigning the value of 1 if a message belongs to a given category and 0 otherwise. 16 The coders
were not informed about any of the hypotheses in the study. All messages within each team in each
period are taken as one observation for coding, resulting in 960 coding observations. Within each
observation, each category for cooperation or collusion is coded either 0 or 1. Therefore, the same
observation may belong to more than one category in each period. We also established two
summary categories label overall cooperation (Panel A of Table 7) and overall collusion (Panel B
of Table 7), which are coded as 1 if any of the specific four categories about cooperation (collusion)
appears, and 0 otherwise.
Table 8 presents pairwise comparisons between conditions using logistic regressions.
There are several general patterns that we see. First, we find that between-team incentives
(BETWEEN and BOTH conditions) increase cooperation within teams (“overall cooperation”
category, all p-values < 0.01). Specifically, compared to NONE and WITHIN conditions, in
BETWEEN and BOTH conditions, individuals are significantly more likely to cooperate with their
team members by proposing to choose high effort within their team or stating their own choices
of high effort (category C2), by agreeing on their team members’ high effort proposals (category
C3) and by giving reasons why they need to choose high efforts (category C4). Second, we find
that between-team incentives (BETWEEN and BOTH conditions) decrease collusion within teams
(“overall collusion” category, all p-values < 0.01). Specifically, individuals are significantly less
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Taking each single team and period as one unit for coding is consistent with Sutter and Strassmair (2009).

16

likely to propose low effort within a team (category C5), to agree on team members’ suggestions
of contributing low effort (category C6), and to give reasons why they need to choose low effort
(category C8). Further, we find that BOTH condition is the most effective in mitigating the
collusion problem (“overall collusion” category, all p-values < 0.05). These findings can be
summarized as follows:
Result 5: Between-team incentives increase cooperation and decrease collusion within
teams, and the collusion problem is mostly mitigated when between-team incentives are combined
with within-team incentives.

5. Discussions and Conclusion
We examine theoretically and experimentally how combining between-team and withinteam incentives affects behavior in team tournaments. The Nash equilibrium predicts that freeriding behavior will occur when there are only between-team incentives, but offering within-team
incentives may solve this problem. However, if individuals collude within a team, then withinteam incentives may not be as effective at reducing free-riding.
The results of our experiment indicate that although between-team incentives are effective
at increasing individual effort, as predicted by the theory, there is substantial free-riding and
declining effort over time. Within-team incentives are also effective at increasing individual effort,
albeit not as effective as between-team incentives in our experiment and not without collusion.
Most importantly, a combination of between-team and within-team incentives is very effective not
only at generating effort but also at sustaining effort over time, mitigating the free-riding problem,
increasing cooperation and decreasing collusion within teams.
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What are the implications of our findings? First, our study provides evidence that
individuals exert the greatest effort when organizations use a combination of between-team and
within-team incentives. Using both incentives simultaneously is important for mitigating the freeriding problem within teams and sustaining effort over time. Not surprisingly, therefore,
tournament-like incentives have been gaining more popularity in the workplace (Che and Yoo,
2001; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007; Connelly et al., 2014).
Second, our findings show that when individuals are allowed to communicate they appear
to not only maximize their individual payoff, but also their joint team payoff. This finding
contributes to the literature studying how communication enhances social identity within teams
(Sutter and Strassmair, 2009; Cason et al., 2012, 2017). Specifically, social identity theory suggests
that one of the most distinctive features of group identity and intergroup relations is positive
distinctiveness – a belief that “we” are better than “them” (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Turner, 1984;
Hogg, 2006). Communication may help individuals to enhance their group identity causing team
members to go to great lengths to protect and promote positive distinctiveness from other teams
and thus contribute more effort to help their teams win reward (Hogg, 2006). Allowing
communication also generalizes to the workplace as between-team tournaments are unlikely in
environments were communication or direct contact between participants is not possible.
Although we only used tournaments in our experiment, we believe that our results are also
applicable to other relative performance incentive settings (Cason et al., 2010, 2019; Agranov and
Tergiman, 2013; Güth et al., 2016). The tournament winner is determined by calculating the
team/individual’s performance (output) relative to other teams/individuals. Although individuals’
absolute effort levels may change when using other relative performance incentives, the direction
of the effort differences across the incentive settings should hold. Future research could explore

18

how effective between-team and within-team incentives are in other relative performance incentive
settings, how individuals change their behavior in response to asymmetric valuations of a reward
or individuals’ heterogeneity in costs/abilities, and how results change when communication is
costly.
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Figure 1: Experimental procedures.
Instructions

Participants are randomly assigned into teams

Decide a team name

Assigned to a condition

Part I

Quiz

Participants
are
randomly
assigned to
new teams

Communicate and make decisions (10 periods)
Part II

Notify individual payoff after each period

Calculate payoff and pay participants

Figure 2: Average effort.
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Figure 3: Average effort across 10 periods.

Figure 4: Frequency of free-riding (effort of 0) across 10 periods.
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Table 1: Summary of experimental conditions.

Between-team
incentive

Within-team incentive
No
Yes
NONE
WITHIN
BETWEEN
BOTH

No
Yes

Table 2: Theoretical predictions.
Condition
NONE

Individual
0

WITHIN

(𝑁𝑁 − 1)𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼
2𝑁𝑁 2
𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼
4𝑁𝑁 2
𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + (2𝑁𝑁 − 1)𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼
4𝑁𝑁 2

BETWEEN
BOTH

Effort prediction
Mixed = (Individual + Joint) / 2
=0
0

=0

Joint
0

= 20

0

=0

= 10

𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼
4𝑁𝑁
𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼
4𝑁𝑁

= 30

= 30

= 30

(𝑁𝑁 − 1)𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼
4𝑁𝑁 2
(𝑁𝑁 + 1) (𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 )
2
4𝑁𝑁 2
(𝑁𝑁 − 1)𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 (𝑁𝑁 + 1) (𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 )
+
4𝑁𝑁 2
2
4𝑁𝑁 2

Table 3: Average effort and payoff.
Condition
NONE
WITHIN
BETWEEN
BOTH

Participants
36
36
36
36

Independent
observations
12
12
12
12

Average
effort
9.47
25.07
42.61
47.15
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Standard
deviation
7.75
7.84
11.31
4.16

Average
payoff
110.53
94.93
77.38
72.35

Standard
deviation
7.75
8.10
11.31
3.87

=0
= 10
= 20
= 30

Table 4: Average effort difference between conditions.
Independent
observations
48
48
24
24
24
24
24
24

Conditions
BOTH + BETWEEN vs. WITHIN + NONE
BOTH + WITHIN
vs. BETWEEN + NONE
BOTH
vs. NONE
BOTH
vs. WITHIN
BOTH
vs. BETWEEN
BETWEEN
vs. WITHIN
BETWEEN
vs. NONE
WITHIN
vs. NONE

Average
difference
27.61
10.07
37.68
22.07
4.53
17.54
33.14
15.61

Wilcoxon
rank-sum
5.62
1.77
4.15
4.15
0.46
3.34
4.09
3.69

p-value
< 0.01
= 0.07
< 0.01
< 0.01
= 0.64
< 0.01
< 0.01
< 0.01

Table 5: Average effort difference between conditions (within-subject comparison).

BOTH
BOTH
BOTH
BETWEEN
BETWEEN
WITHIN

Conditions
vs. NONE
vs. WITHIN
vs. BETWEEN
vs. WITHIN
vs. NONE
vs. NONE

Independent
observations
8
8
8
8
8
8

Average
difference
33.60
25.85
13.53
19.74
36.23
20.94

Wilcoxon
signed-rank
2.52
2.52
2.24
2.52
2.52
2.52

Table 6: Time series cross-sectional regression analysis.
Independent
variables
Period

NONE
-1.06***
(0.47)
15.30***
(3.82)

WITHIN
0.25
(0.37)
23.67***
(2.45)

Condition
BETWEEN
BOTH
-1.20***
-0.32
(0.41)
(0.42)
49.24***
48.91***
(2.74)
(2.37)

All conditions
-0.58***
(0.22)
Constant
12.67***
(2.61)
WITHIN
15.60***
(3.08)
BETWEEN
33.14***
(3.83)
BOTH
37.68***
(2.45)
Note: * p-value < 0.10, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01
Standard errors clustered at the individual group level are in parenthesis.
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p-value
= 0.01
= 0.01
= 0.02
= 0.01
= 0.01
= 0.01

Table 7: Frequency of communication messages.
Category
C1
C2
C3
C4

C5
C6
C7
C8

Description

NONE
WITHIN
Panel A: Cooperation within teams
Ask for the opinions of other team members
0.188
0.333
Proposal to choose high efforts within team
or state own choice of high efforts
Agree on team members’ proposals of high
effort
Give reasons why need to choose high
efforts
Overall cooperation

BOTH

0.379

0.396

0.129

0.167

0.654

0.692

0.058

0.075

0.554

0.571

0.025

0.008

0.104

0.146

0.263

0.413

0.725

0.750

0.558

0.221

0.129

0.392

0.146

0.063

0.142

0.000

0.021

0.167

0.050

0.038

0.600

0.221

0.146

Panel B: Collusion within teams
Proposal to choose low efforts within team
0.529
or state own choice of low efforts
Agree on team members’ proposals of low
0.371
effort
Proposal to take turns in winning the
0.000
tournament
Give reasons why need to choose low efforts
0.233
Overall collusion

BETWEEN

0.567

Note: Each cell represents the likelihood of a particular message being used in a given period within a team.

Table 8: Comparison of communication messages.
Category

BOTH
vs.
NONE

C1
C2
C3
C4
Overall

***
***
***
***
***

C5
C6
C7
C8
Overall

***
***
NA
***
***

BOTH
BOTH
BETWEEN
vs.
vs.
vs.
WITHIN
BETWEEN
WITHIN
Panel A: Cooperation within teams
0.131
0.690
***
***
0.371
***
***
0.637
***
***
0.157
**
***
0.519
***
Panel B: Collusion within teams
***
*
***
***
*
***
***
N/A
N/A
***
0.504
***
***
*
***

BETWEEN
vs.
NONE

WITHIN
vs.
NONE

0.266
***
***
**
***

**
0.242
0.463
0.173
**

***
***
N/A
***
***

0.517
0.636
N/A
0.067
0.456

Note: Each cell represents a p-value based on Wald Chi-Square statistics.
* p-value < 0.05, ** p-value < 0.001, *** p-value < 0.0001
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Appendix A (For Online Publication) – Theoretical Derivations
We can rewrite the expected payoff (4) as:
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �𝛼𝛼 𝑋𝑋

𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴

𝐴𝐴 +𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵

1

1

𝑥𝑥

Further expanding the expression, we get:
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �𝛼𝛼 𝑋𝑋
𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴

𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴

𝐴𝐴 +𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵

𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴 +𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵

1

1

+ (1 − 𝛼𝛼) 2� �𝑁𝑁 𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + �𝛽𝛽 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽) 𝑁𝑁� 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 � − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 .
1

1

𝐴𝐴

𝑥𝑥

+ (1 − 𝛼𝛼) 2� �𝑁𝑁 (𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 ) + 𝛽𝛽 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 � − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =

𝛼𝛼 𝑁𝑁 (𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 ) + 𝑋𝑋
11

𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

𝐴𝐴 +𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵

𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 +
1

𝑥𝑥

𝐴𝐴

(A1)

.

(A2)

+(1 − 𝛼𝛼) 2 𝑁𝑁 (𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 ) + (1 − 𝛼𝛼) 2 𝛽𝛽 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴

Differentiating (A2) with respect to 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , we receive the following FOC:
𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵

(𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴 +𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵

)2

1

𝛼𝛼 𝑁𝑁 (𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 ) +

𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴 +𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵 −𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼
(𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴 +𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵 )2

Solving for the symmetric Nash equilibrium, we receive:
∗
∗
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
=

𝛼𝛼(𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 +𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 )+𝛽𝛽(2𝑁𝑁−2)𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼
4𝑁𝑁 2

1

+ (1 − 𝛼𝛼) 2 𝛽𝛽

𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴 −𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑉𝑉
(𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴 )2 𝐼𝐼

.

= 1.

(A3)

(A4)

If the expected payoff is given by (6), then the maximization problem is the following:
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �𝛼𝛼 𝑋𝑋

𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴

𝐴𝐴 +𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵

1

+ (1 − 𝛼𝛼) 2� (𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 ) − 𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴 .

(A5)

Further expanding the expression, we get:
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 𝑋𝑋

𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴

1

(𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 ) + (1 − 𝛼𝛼) (𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 + 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 ) − 𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴 .

(A6)

+ 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 ) = 1.

(A7)

𝐴𝐴 +𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵

2

Differentiating (A6) with respect to 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , we receive the following FOC:
𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵
𝛼𝛼(𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇
(𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴 +𝑋𝑋𝐵𝐵 )2

Solving for the symmetric Nash equilibrium, we receive:
∗
∗
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
=

𝛼𝛼(𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇 +𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼 )
4𝑁𝑁

.

(A8)
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Appendix B (For Online Publication) – Experimental Instructions
General Instructions
Welcome! You are participating in a decision-making study. The study will proceed in two parts.
Each part requires you to make a series of choices which will determine your total compensation
for the study.
Your decisions as well as the decisions of other participants will remain anonymous. The
decision problems are not designed to test you; there is no right or wrong answer. I am simply
interested in the choices you make. You will be paid privately in cash at the end of the study.
The points you earn in the study will be converted to U.S. Dollars at a rate of 20 to 1. The
amount you earn will depend on your decisions, so please follow the instructions carefully.
Please turn off your cell phone, laptop computer, or any other device you may have brought with
you. To maintain anonymity, please do not communicate, unless directed otherwise, with any
other participants until the study is completely over. If at any point you have a question, or need
assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and I will come to your desk. Thank you for your
cooperation.
Instructions for Part 1
Part 1 of the study consists of several decision-making periods. At the beginning of the first
period, you will be randomly and anonymously placed into a team of 3 people. You will remain
in the same team for all periods in Part 1 of the study.
At the beginning of the first period, your team will be randomly paired with another team to
share bonuses. Your team will be paired with the same team for all periods in Part 1 of the
study.
TEAM NAME
After you are assigned to a team, you will be asked to communicate with your team members via
a chat window to decide on a team name. However, to maintain anonymity, it is very important
that you do not reveal your name, seat number or anything that might disclose your identity to
your teammates.
YOUR DECISION
Assume you are an employee of ABC Company. Your compensation package consists of the
following:
(1) a base salary (your participation fee today),
(2) any endowed points you keep (unallocated points), and
(3) two bonuses to be awarded at the end of each period: Group Bonus and Individual Bonus.
In each period your company will award two bonuses:
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Group Bonus = 180 points;
Individual Bonus = 180 points.
In each period you will be given an endowment of 60 points and asked to decide how much to
contribute. You may contribute any whole number of points between 0 and 60, inclusively. Any
leftover or unallocated points are yours to keep (60 – Points Contributed).
For each one point you contribute, you will generate one unit of individual output. A team’s total
output is the sum of all members’ individual outputs within the team.
A hypothetical example is:

Team 1

Team 2

Member 1
Member 2
Member 3

Individual Output
= Points Contributed
60
30
10

Team Output
(Sum of Individual Outputs)
Team 1 Output
= 60+ 30 + 10 = 100

Member 1
Member 2
Member 3

50
35
20

Team 2 Output
= 50 + 35 + 20 = 105

The Individual Bonus and Group Bonus will be awarded as described below.
COMMUNICATION
Each period, before you decide how many points to contribute, you will have the opportunity to
chat electronically with the members of your OWN team via an anonymous chat window. You
will have 90 seconds to chat with each other at the beginning of Period 1 and 2, and 40 seconds
in the following periods.
Again, to remain anonymity, it is very important that you do not make threats or reveal your
name, seat number or anything that might disclose your identity. While the content of your
discussion has no direct binding impact on the output or bonuses, you can use the chat window to
discuss strategy with your teammates.

30

(NONE Condition) YOUR EARNINGS
After all participants have made their decisions, your earnings for the period are calculated as
follows:
(1) Your period earnings are the sum of the earnings from the endowed points you keep
AND any bonuses you receive from the company.
(2) You may keep or contribute all or some of your 60 points endowment.
The points you contribute will generate individual and team outputs.
(3) No matter what each team’s total output is, each TEAM will receive 90 points for Group
Bonus AND 90 points for Individual Bonus.
For example, if the outputs of both teams are as in the table below, both TEAMS will
receive the same amount for Group and Individual Bonus.
Team Output
Team 1
Team 2
Total

Individual & Group bonuses Received

160
40
200

50% = 90 points
50% = 90 points
100%

(4) Every TEAM MEMBER within each team will equally share the Group AND
Individual bonuses.
PAYMENT
At the end of the study ONE period will be randomly chosen from Part 1 of the study for cash
payment. Each period has an equal chance of being chosen. Hence each period is independent
and you should make your decisions carefully in every period. The earnings for the period
chosen will be converted to a U.S. dollar payment at the end of the study.
Are there any questions?
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(BETWEEN Condition) YOUR EARNINGS
After all participants have made their decisions, your earnings for the period are calculated as
follows:
(1) Your period earnings are the sum of the earnings from the endowed points you keep
AND any bonuses you receive from the company.
(2) You may keep or contribute all or some of your 60 points endowment.
The points you contribute will generate individual and team outputs which may help your
team earn Group and/or Individual bonuses as described below.
(3) Only one TEAM will receive the Group AND Individual Bonuses. The Group and
Individual Bonuses will be awarded to your TEAM based on your team’s output relative
to the two teams’ total output. For example, if your TEAM contributes 70% of the two
teams’ total output, your TEAM’s likelihood of winning the Group AND Individual
Bonuses is 70%.
That is, the greater your TEAM output, the more likely your TEAM will receive both
bonuses.
For example, if the outputs of both teams are as in the table below, Team 1 has a 80%
(=160/200) chance of winning the Group and Individual Bonus.

Team 1
Team 2
Total

Team Output
160
40
200

Chance (Probability) of Winning
Individual & Group Bonuses
160/200 = 80%
40/200 = 20%
100%

(4) If awarded, every team member within the winning team will equally share the Group
AND Individual Bonuses.
PAYMENT
At the end of the study ONE period will be randomly chosen from Part 1 of the study for cash
payment. Each period has an equal chance of being chosen. Hence each period is independent
and you should make your decisions carefully in every period. The earnings for the period
chosen will be converted to a U.S. dollar payment at the end of the study.
Are there any questions?
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Instructions for Part 2
The Part 2 of the study also consists of several decision-making periods.
PLEASE NOTE:
All teams formed in Part 1 of the study are NOW DISBANDED.
You will be randomly and anonymously placed into a NEW team of 3 people. Your new
teammates will NOT be any of the same people you were previously paired with. You will
remain in the same (new) team for all periods in Part 2 of the study.
At the beginning of the first period, your team will be randomly paired with another team to
share bonuses. Your team will be paired with the same team for all periods in Part 2 of the
study.
NEW TEAM NAME
After you are assigned to a NEW team, you will be asked to communicate with your NEW team
members via a chat window to decide on a NEW team name. Again, to maintain anonymity, it is
very important that you do not reveal your name, seat number or anything that might disclose
your identity to your teammates.
YOUR DECISION (Same as in Part 1)
Suppose you have changed companies and your new employer is XYZ Company. You will make
the same decision as in Part 1.
In each period your new company will also award two bonuses:
Group Bonus = 180 points;
Individual Bonus = 180 points.
However, the method for determining who gets what is DIFFERENT.
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(WITHIN Condition in “NONE&WITHIN combination”) YOUR EARNINGS
After all participants have made their decisions, your earnings for the period are calculated as
follows:
(1) Your period earnings are the sum of the earnings from the endowed points you keep
AND any bonuses you receive from the company.
(2) You may keep or contribute all or some of your 60 points endowment.
The points you contribute will generate individual and team outputs which may help your
team earn Group and/or Individual bonuses as described below.

Same as
Part 1

(3) No matter what each team’s total output is, each TEAM will receive 90 points for Group
Bonus AND 90 points for Individual Bonus.
For example, if the outputs of both teams are as in the table below, both teams will
receive the same amount for Group and Individual Bonus.

Team 1
Team 2
Total

Team Output
160
40
200

Individual & Group bonuses Received
50% = 90 points
50% = 90 points
100%

(4) Every TEAM MEMBER within each team will equally share the Group Bonus, i.e. 30
points per team member.
(5) However, only one member within each team will receive the Individual Bonus. The
Individual Bonus will be awarded to you based on your individual output relative to the
total output within your team. For example, if you contribute 70% of your team’s total
output, your likelihood of winning the Individual Bonus is 70%.
That is, the greater your individual output, the more likely you will receive the
Individual bonus.
Different
from
Part 1

For example, if the outputs of all members within a team are as in the table below,
Member 2 has a 30% (=30/100) chance of winning the Individual Bonus.
Team 1 or 2
Member 1
Member 2
Member 3
Total

Individual Output
60
30
10
100

Chance (Probability) of Winning Individual Bonus
60/100 = 60%
30/100 = 30%
10/100 = 10%
100%
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(BOTH Condition in “WITHIN&BOTH combination”) YOUR EARNINGS
After all participants have made their decisions, your earnings for the period are calculated as
follows:
(1) Your period earnings are the sum of the earnings from the endowed points you keep
AND any bonuses you receive from the company.
Same as
Part 1

(2) You may keep or contribute all or some of your 60 points endowment.
The points you contribute will generate individual and team outputs which may help your
team earn Group and/or Individual bonuses as described below.
(3) Only one TEAM will receive the Group AND Individual Bonuses. The Group and
Individual Bonuses will be awarded to your TEAM based on your team’s output relative
to the two teams’ total output. For example, if your TEAM contributes 70% of the two
teams’ total output, your TEAM’s likelihood of winning both bonuses (Group AND
Individual Bonuses) is 70%.
That is, the greater the output your TEAM contributes, the more likely your TEAM will
receive both bonuses.
For example, if the outputs of both teams are as in the table below, Team 1 has a 80%
(=160/200) chance of winning the Group and Individual Bonus.
Team 1
Team 2
Total

Different
from
Part 1

Team Output
160
40
200

Chance (Probability) of Winning
Individual & Group Bonuses
160/200 = 80%
40/200 = 20%
100%

(4) If awarded, every team member within the winning team will equally share the Group
Bonus.
(5) However, if awarded the Individual Bonus, only one member within the winning team
will receive the Individual Bonus. The Individual Bonus will be awarded to you based on
your individual output relative to the total output within your team. For example, if you
contribute 70% of your team’s total output, your likelihood of winning the Individual
Bonus is 70%.
That is, the greater your individual output, the more likely you will receive the
Individual bonus.
For example, if the outputs of all members within a team are as in the table below,
Member 2 has a 30% (=30/100) chance of winning the Individual Bonus.
Team 1 or 2
Member 1
Member 2
Member 3
Total

Individual Output
60
30
10
100

Chance (Probability) of Winning Individual Bonus
60/100 = 60%
30/100 = 30%
10/100 = 10%
100%
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PAYMENT
At the end of the study ONE period will also be randomly chosen from Part 2 of the study for
cash payment. Each period has an equal chance of being chosen. Hence each period is
independent and you should make your decisions carefully in every period. The earnings for the
period chosen will be converted to a U.S. dollar payment at the end of the study.

Are there any questions?
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Manipulation Check (Part 1: ABC company; Part 2: XYZ company)
Part 1: Please answer the following questions (choose only ONE option for each question):
1. At the end of each period in the study, the ABC (XYZ) company will award its
employees:
A. Group Bonus
B. Individual Bonus
C. Group and Individual bonuses
2. The ABC (XYZ) company will award the Group and Individual bonuses to a TEAM
based on:
A. a team’s output relative to the two teams’ total output. That is, the greater of a team’s
output is, the more likely the team will receive the Group Bonus.
B. Each team equally shares the Group and Individual bonuses.
3. When a team receives the Group Bonus:
A. The team member with greater output will be more likely to receive the Group Bonus.
B. Every member within the team equally shares the Group Bonus.
4. When a team receives the Individual Bonus:
A. The team member with greater output will be more likely to receive the Individual
Bonus.
B. Every member within the team equally shares the Individual Bonus.
******************************************************************************
Please do NOT turn to the next page BEFORE you answer the questions above.
The correct answers to the questions on previous page are (the given answers depend on the
condition the participant is assigned to):
Question
1
2
3
4

NONE
C
B
B
B

WITHIN
C
B
B
A

BETWEEN
C
A
B
B

Please check your answers and re-evaluate any wrong answers.
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BOTH
C
A
B
A

Appendix C (For Online Publication) – Additional Analysis

Table 4C: Average effort difference between conditions (only Part 1 of the experiment).
Independent
observations
24
24
12
12
12
12
12
12

Conditions
BOTH + BETWEEN vs. WITHIN + NONE
BOTH + WITHIN
vs. BETWEEN + NONE
BOTH
vs. NONE
BOTH
vs. WITHIN
BOTH
vs. BETWEEN
BETWEEN
vs. WITHIN
BETWEEN
vs. NONE
WITHIN
vs. NONE

Average
difference
28.02
7.93
35.96
27.50
7.42
20.08
28.53
8.45

Wilcoxon
rank-sum
3.98
1.15
2.88
2.88
0.80
2.56
2.72
3.69

p-value
< 0.01
= 0.24
< 0.01
< 0.01
= 0.42
< 0.01
< 0.01
= 0.03

Table 6C: Time series cross-sectional regression analysis (only Part 1 of the experiment).
Independent
variables
Period

NONE
-0.58*
(0.33)
17.01***
(3.39)

WITHIN
0.39
(0.55)
20.05***
(2.91)

Condition
BETWEEN
BOTH
-1.11***
-0.23
(0.74)
(0.77)
48.45***
51.03***
(2.49)
(3.62)

All conditions
-0. 38**
(0.31)
Constant
15.90***
(3.18)
WITHIN
8.45**
(3.80)
BETWEEN
28.53***
(5.43)
BOTH
35.96***
(3.05)
Note: * p-value < 0.10, ** p-value < 0.05, *** p-value < 0.01
Standard errors clustered at the individual group level are in parenthesis.
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